The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process in Debtor-Creditor Relations: From Snidach to North Georgia Finishing by Rasmussen, Scott David
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1975
The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process
in Debtor-Creditor Relations: From Snidach to
North Georgia Finishing
Scott David Rasmussen
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott D. Rasmussen, The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process in Debtor-Creditor Relations: From Snidach to North Georgia
Finishing, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 339 (1975).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol8/iss2/3
THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS IN DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS:
FROM SNIADACH TO NORTH GEORGIA FINISHING
The debtor seeking to contest prejudgment seizure of his property
on grounds that the ex parte statutory procedure employed violates the
fourteenth amendment proscription against deprivations of property
without due process of law1 is confronted with the problem of reconcil-
ing United States Supreme Court pronouncements upon state proce-
dures which possess indistinct dissimilarities. Fuentes v. Shevin set
forth the broad rule that due process under the fourteenth amendment
requires that an individual be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard before being deprived of his property.3 This rule was side-
stepped in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,4 where the Supreme Court sus-
tained under fourteenth amendment due process attack a Louisiana se-
questration procedure permitting judicially authorized seizure of goods
on the ex parte application of an installment contract creditor. Notice
to the debtor and an opportunity to be heard prior to being deprived
of property to which he held full legal title were not statutorily pro-
vided. 6 By leaving Fuentes intact, the Mitchell Court preserved par-
allel and partially conflicting lines of authority in the area of summary
prejudgment remedies. Due process analysis could proceed with
either of two tests pronounced by the court within a span of two years:
Fuentes' absolute standard proscribing deprivation not preceded by no-
tice and hearing7 or Mitchells balancing approach which weighs each
party's respective interest in the property claimed and the risks inherent
in either position, adjudicating the constitutionality of the procedure on
the basis of an accommodation between these factors.8
Against this background of dual precedent stands North Georgia Fin-
1. "[IMor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. Id. at 96.
4. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In Mitchell, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
-and Powell agreed that Fuentes was overruled to the extent that Mitchell withdrew from
its broad proscription.
5. See note 47 infra.
6. 416 U.S. at 601, 603.
7. 407 U.S. at 96.
8. 416 U.S. at 604-07.
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ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,' a case involving the garnishment of a cor-
porate debtor's bank account. While invalidating the garnishment pro-
cedure on fourteenth amendment grounds similar to Fuentes, the Court
distinguished Mitchell because the garnishment did not sufficiently
compare with the mechanics of sequestration which assure procedural
due process. 10 Whether Fuentes is to represent the rule and Mitchell
the exception or whether North Georgia Finishing itself composes a
synthetic due process standard for reviewing summary ex parte pro-
cedures remains unclear. The future disposition of this issue will de-
pend upon a critical dissection of the statutory procedures under these
precedents.
I. SNIADACH-FUENTS
The sweeping due process test enunciated by the Court in Fuentes
received nascent formulation in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp."1
Sniadach had represented a departure from traditional due process
scrutiny where rights in property were sought to be protected by sum-
mary ex parte prejudgment remedies.'
2
A. The Pre-Sniadach Position
Although pre-Sniadach precedent required that notice and hearing,
the essentials of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment,"'
be granted before final dispossession, neither were deemed funda-
mental at the prejudgment stage:
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the ju-
9. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
10. Id. at 722-23.
11. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
12. The Court had approved prejudgment attachment liens effected by creditors with-
out notice and opportunity for hearing where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was secured by
the attachment over a foreign defendant's local property. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94 (1921). Broad language had also supported the general practice of the cred-
itor's use of prejudgment attachment liens in Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928), cited without comment in McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929). Where
immediate state intervention would allevaite threats to public health posed by mis-
branded articles in commerce, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950), or where other significant governmental interests were at stake, Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank regulation); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (enforcement of federal tax lien), use of summary prejudgment attachment proc-
ess by the state received the Court's sanction. Prior to Sniadach, however, McKay had
been the only case to deal with summary prejudgment seizure for exclusively private pur-
poses. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914).
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dicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given
for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.14
Summary ex parte prejudgment remedies found precedent in situa-
tions where the dispossessing party could demonstrate private action
undertaken pursuant to contractual agreement, 15 an overriding govern-
mental interest in securing the property pendente lite,16 or danger that
the purpose of a final action would be defeated, or made excessively
difficult, by requiring a prior hearing.' 7  The fact that certain practices
in debtor-creditor relations were perpetuated by tradition has entered
into the test of procedural due process. 8
14. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931), quoted with approval in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974).
15. The due process clause by its terms comprehends only state action. Section 9-
503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted with variations by every state except
Louisiana, authorizes self-help repossession of collateral by a secured creditor on debtor's
default under the terms of the parties' security agreement. Whether such statutory au-
thorization constitutes state action so as to be brought within the operation of the Snia-
dach-Fuentes principle has been negatively answered. Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc.,
496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley
v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern California First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322
F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). For the view that invalidation of section 9-503 may
not necessarily follow from invalidation of other summary prejudgment remedies, see
Comment, Remedies on Default Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as
Compared to Remedies Under Conditional Sales, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 246, 256 (1956).
Contractual waiver of constitutional rights has been an alternate ground for decision.
E.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (cognovit procedure held valid under four-
teenth amendment due process attack); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972) (contractual waiver in cognovit procedure not violative of fourteenth amend-
ment); Brunswick Corp. v. L. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). But see
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
16. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (ex-
clusion of civilian from Naval Gun Factory for national security purposes upheld); note
12 supra; cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414 (1944) (summary procedures prescribed by the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942 upheld); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (seizure of
property pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act). See also Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972).
17. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 12 (1963); 7 CJ.S. Attachment
§ 2(5) (b) (1937). Grounds for sequestration lie "if it is within the power of the de-
fendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or re-
move the property . . . ." LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961). Thus,
the purpose of the writ is to secure the subject matter of the later action. Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154-
55 (1974); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320
(1908).
18. [l-othing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be
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In light of traditional trade customs, "attachment was deemed 'part
of the remedy provided for the collection of the debt'. . . and repre-
sented a practice that 'had become fully established . . . . "' With-
out the full protection of this remedy, creditors would presumably be
less inclined to extend secured credit because of concomitant decreases
in profit margins. 20 To the seller, the utility of sales credit is integrally
related to collateralization of the loan and the summary availability of
the collateral once the buyer has defaulted. For this purpose, it was
deemed necessary for the creditor's remedy at law to be both summary
and ex parte. If relief is delayed by the requirements of prior notice
and hearing, it may become altogether worthless. 2 1 Prior to Sniadach,
the timing of the hearing to adjudicate property interests in commercial
transactions was construed by the courts to be variable, depending upon
such factors as the nature of the property or the interest to be di-
vested.22
B. The Sniadach-Fuentes Opposition
Sniadach dealt with the prejudgment garnishment of wages, a "spe-
cialized type of property, '23 deprivation of which could, as a practical
matter, "drive a wage earning family to the wall."24 In holding garnish-
ment proceedings violative of the due process guarantee of the four-
teenth amendment because taking of a significant property interest was
effected without prior notice and hearing,25 the opinion stands as a
landmark not only in reawakening to due process scrutiny prejudgment
creditor remedies not reviewed by the Court since 1928,20 but also in
creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon
the result of the suit. We see nothing in this case that requires further argument
to show that the decision below was right.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613 (1974), quoting Coffin Bros. & Co. V.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928) (emphasis added).
19. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974).
20. Creditors will seek to eliminate buyers who pose poor credit risks. The rippling
economic effects of discarding summary repossession remedies may be particularly harsh
on lower income purchasers who must rely upon credit to secure many necessities. See
Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 14-25, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972).
21. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974).
22. For history and discussion of the type and timing of the hearing required under
the due process clause, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 177-203 (1974) (White,
I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. 395 U.S. at 340.
24. Id. at 341-42.
25. Id. at 342.
26. See note 12 supra.
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subjecting such procedures to an analysis which for the first time took
into account the deprivative impact on the dispossessed party.
7
Granted that severity of the deprivation and its effect on the debtor's
livelihood enter into the assessment of procedural due process in com-
mercial transactions, distinctions may logically arise depending upon the
nature of the specific items of property to be dispossessed. The timing
of a hearing sufficient to satisfy due process might thus depend upon
whether the property is to be categorized as a necessity or a non-neces-
sity. As many federal and state courts construed the lesson of
Sniadach, the greater the necessity of the particular goods in maintain-
ing a rudimentary standard of living, the earlier the hearing was neces-
sitated.28  "Necessities" would thus form a seemingly logical dividing
line between preseizure hearings and those which might constitutionally
be postponed until the creditor has regained control over the subject
matter of the debt.29
Gradations in the importance or severity of the deprivation of various
consumer goods in determining whether they are deserving of presei-
zure notice and hearing protection, insofar as they rest on subjec-
tive evaluation, must be artificial.3 0 Fuentes, in laying to rest such lim-
ited constructions of Sniadach, found it necessary to distill the central
meaning of procedural due process from precedent." The purpose of
27. 395 U.S. at 340-42.
28. Cases limiting the reach of the Sniadach principle to procedures which work "tre-
mendous hardships" on families, etc., include: In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir.
1972); American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Jernigan v.
Economy Exterminating Co., 327 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Reeves v. Motor Con-
tract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323
F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Wheeler v. Adams, 322 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Md. 1971);
cases cited in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972). For a comprehensive list-
ing by jurisdiction of case law interpretation of the Sniadach principle, see Hawkland,
The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 79 CAsE & COM., Jan.-Feb., 1974, at 3, 10.
29. See note 28 supra.
30. No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance" or "necessity"
of various consumer goods. Stoves could be compared to television sets, or beds
could be compared to tables. But if the root principle of due process is to be ap-
plied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment speaks of "property" generally. And, under our free-enterprise system, an in-
dividual's choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem
to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights
to make its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect onlk the ones that,
by its own lights, are "necessary."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89-90 (1972).
31. Three Supreme Court cases prior to Sniadach dealt with the constitutionality of
prejudgment attachment liens effected by creditors without notice or hearing: McKay
v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928); Coffin Bros. & Co., v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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a constitutional right to be heard is to "protect [the individual's] use
and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment, ' 82 thus mini-
nlzing "substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a
danger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon
the application of and for the benefit of a private party."83
In the estimation of the Fuentes Court, the right to a hearing would
be purposeless were it not granted to the debtor in time to prevent arbi-
trary or mistaken seizures by state officials: "[No later hearing and
no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was
subject to the right of procedural due process has already oc-
curred."34 Hence, while the sufficiency and form of the hearing itself
"are legitimately open to many potential variations"85 and while the
deprivation is only temporary and not final,8 the Court held due proc-
ess to be denied absent "the right to a prior opportunity to be heard
before chattels are taken from their possessor."
' 7
Exceptional circumstances were the sole exemptions from the rigor-
ous exercise of the Fuentes principle.38  The Court painstakingly de-
lineated those "truly unusual" situations where seizure without oppor-
tunity for a prior hearing to contest the seizure had been allowed by
the Court and would in the future be justifiable.39
The guarantee of a hearing prior to dispossession necessarily entails
greater costs by diminishing the speed and efficiency with which a se-
cured creditor may by judicial process attach collateral in the possession
of his debtor. This delay in turn affects a credit seller's interest by
diminishing the value of security he may have for the debt,40 yet the
Fuentes majority concluded that such costs "cannot outweigh the consti-
tutional right."'41 Fuentes reasons that procedural due process cannot
equally accommodate both parties' interests under an installment sale
of goods because only one is entitled to possession of which he may
be deprived:
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accom-
modate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular in-
32. 407 U.S. at 81.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 82.
35. Id. at 96.
36. Id. at 84, 85.
37. Id. at 96 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 90.
39. Id. at 91-92; see note 12 supra.
40. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608 (1974).
41. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22, 92 n.29.
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terests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken.
4 2
While the installment contract creditor might stand to lose his security
or remaining interest in the merchandise through his debtor's improper
acts, these rights are not in jeopardy from processes sanctioned
by law. Where conflicting private claims to property arise, due process
would require those rights most susceptible to deprivation without due
process of law to take precedence. The paramount interest which must
receive procedural due process protection is the one subject to wrongful
deprivation under process of law.4 3  Therefore, under Fuentes' con-
struction of the due process clause, if exceptional circumstances cannot
be demonstrated, the party in possession may not have his possession
disrupted by any procedure which does not provide him the due process
preseizure safeguards of notice and a hearing.44
I1. MITCHELL'S ACCOMMODATION
W.T. Grant Company, a nationwide chain store retailer of general
merchandise, filed a petition in the First City Court for the City of New
Orleans, alleging $574.17 past due and owing on purchases of a re-
frigerator, stove, washing machine and phonograph made by defendant
Lawrence Mitchell.4 5  Grants petition declared entitlement to a
vendor's lien,46 prayed for judgment in the amount of $574.17 with le-
gal interest and requested that a writ of sequestration immediately issue
"to protect plaintiff's interest in the matter."47 The petition contained
42. Id. at 90 n.22.
43. id.
44. Id. at 96.
45. 416 U.S. at 601.
46. See note 77 infra.
47. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) thereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief]. Louisiana's relevant statutory provisions
are as follows:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the nature of the
claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance
of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by, or
by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel or agent.
The applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the payment of the
damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrongfully.
LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of
attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which
the writ was issued ....
Id. art. 3506.
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a mortgage,
lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under a writ of seques-
tration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste
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an affidavit by Grant's credit manager verifying these facts, coupled
with an assertion that the petitioner had reason to fear and believe that
the defendant would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the
merchandise . . . during the pendency of these proceedings . ... 1
Upon Grant's furnishing bond for $1,125.00, the Judge of the City
Court signed an order authorizing the requested writ of sequestration.
Approximately ten days later, the constable of the City Court served
Mitchell at his residence with Grant's petition and the writ of sequestra-
tion. At the same time, Mitchell's appliances were seized, loaded into
Grant's truck and taken to Grant's place of storage.40
After an adversary hearing on Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ
of sequestration on the ground that seizure of his appliances without
prior notice and hearing deprived him of procedural due process, the
trial court judge denied the motion. He assigned in his "Reasons for
Judgment" that "provisional seizure enforced through sequestration was
not a denial of due process and, in this instance, did not impinge upon
defendant's constitutional rights." 50 The Louisiana Supreme Court, re-
viewing the motion to dissolve on Mitchell's application after the Louisi-
ana Court of Appeals had refused to dissolve the writ, affirmed the rul-
ing of the trial court.5 The United States Supreme Court, granting
Mitchell's petition for writ of certiorari, 52 affirmed on the question of
whether the sequestration by judicial order of property purchased on
credit without prior notice to the installment buyer and opportunity for
a hearing violated the fourteenth amendment.5
3
Petitioner Mitchell urged that the same prior hearing and notice due
petitioner Fuentes under the Florida replevin statute was due him
under the Louisiana sequestration statute because the two procedures
were constitutionally indistinguishable. The Mitchell Court, however,
rejecting such analogy to precedent,54 found Fuentes "decided against
the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the parish,
during the pendency of the action.
Id. art. 3571.
48. 416 U.S. at 602; see LA. CODE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
49. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
52. 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
53. 416 U.S. at 603.
54. At least one state court was reluctant to declare unconstitutional a state statute
based upon a decision supported by less than a clear majority of the Court. In Roofing
Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Ariz. 1972), the argument was accepted
that, because two justices did not participate in the Fuentes opinion (Justices Powell and
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a factual and legal background sufficiently different [from the Louisi-
ana sequestration procedure]." 55
Mitchell's due process standard takes for its starting point the
premise that the fourteenth amendment due process clause is neither
a technical nor an inflexible formula applicable to all situations, but
rather an ad hoc constitutional accommodation between competing in-
terests.5" Mitchell implements such an accommodation through a two-
fold analysis. First, if the state, in providing statutory intervention to a
disputant over possession of chattels, minimizes the risk57 of mistaken
wrongful deprivation by its officials, and, second, if upon a review of
the "realities" of the transaction, the Court concludes that the state pro-
cedure as a whole reaches a constitutional accommodation of the re-
spective interests, then the procedure will be upheld.58
A. Risk Minimization
The Court's initial premise is that judicial control will minimize the
risk that the ex parte sequestration procedure will lead to a wrongful
taking. It supports this proposition by adumbrating the factors which
the Louisiana procedures provided to enable judicial control of the
process.59 First, the applicant for the writ of sequestration must make
a factually convincing showing to the issuing magistrate.60 The nature
of the claim, the amount, and the grounds relied upon for issuance of
the writ must clearly appear from "specific facts" shown by verified pe-
tition or affidavit."1 Second, the petitioner must make the requisite
showing to a magistrate, rather than to a court clerk or other court func-
tionary, before authorization for the seizure may be obtained.
6 2
Rehnquist), the four justice majority decision is only an advisory opinion, therefore not
binding on state courts. Compare Justice Stewart's perception of similar treatment of
Fuentes by the Court. 416 U.S. at 634-36.
55. 416 U.S. at 615.
56. Id. at 607.
57. Id. at 616-18. By contrast, no risk of wrongful seizure by state officials was
acceptable to the Fuentes Court so long as an alternative procedure was available which
could foreclose the possibility of error: opportunity for an adversarial hearing prior to
issuance of the writ. 407 U.S. at 81-83.
58. 416 U.S. at 608-09, 618-19. In contradistinction, Fuentes' due process analysis
initially determined at what point in time the debtor was afforded notice and opportu-
nity to defend against summary process, broadly invalidating any procedure which per-
mitted hearing of the issues pertinent to seizure subsequent to the actual taking of the
property. 407 U.S. at 80-86.
59. 416 U.S. at 608-10.
60. Id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
61. See note 47 supra.
62. 416 U.S. at 615-16.
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Judicial approval of the writ is not a function exercised by a judge in
a ministerial capacity.' Third, the issues to be determined and the
ease with which they may be proven by documentary evidence under
the Louisiana procedures reduce both the need for an adversarial hear-
ing on whether the writ should issue and the risk that the writ wrong-
fully issue. 4
The dissenting opinions seriously challenge the Mitchell majority's
assertion that judicial participation in this circumstance may in fact re-
duce wrongful seizures.6 5 Justices Powell and Stewart debate issuance
of the writ as a "ministerial" function and the extent to which the issu-
ing trial judge acts on knowledge before permitting the state to enter
into the conflict over property.6  Justice Stewart openly avows that se-
questration procedure is indistinguishable from replevin albeit the ex
parte application is to be made to a judge instead of a court clerkY.
7 It
63. Id. at 616 n.12.
64. Id. at 617-18. Contra, id. at 633-34 (dissenting opinion). The Court draws an
analogy from tort law in distinguishing sequestration from Fuentes' replevin procedure.
Replevin, which under the Florida statute must be utilized only if the property was
wrongfully detained (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972-73)) is a fault standard "in-
herently subject to factual determination and adversarial input." 416 U.S. at 617. Se-
questration, by analogy to strict liability, apparently does not require a showing of com-
plicated interrelationship between certain factors as does a fault showing, but in this case
only the existence of a lien, possession by the debtor, and an allegation of default under
the terms of the sales contract. Accord, Sugar v. Curtiss Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (where the issue before the state court considering issuance of at-
tachment order is an allegation of fraud, ex parte determination not suitable). But see
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 633 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("[ihere is, however, absolutely no support for this purported distinction").
65. 416 U.S. at 631 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 616 n.12; cf. id. at 632-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting). At least one lower
federal court has recently considered the issue:
The presence of the justice of the peace in the West Virginia procedural pattern
is a distinction without a difference. When issuing the distress warrant, the justice
of the peace is performing a nonjudicial act similar to the Pennsylvania prothono-
tary [in Parham v. Cortese, consolidated with Fuentes], and his magisterial impri-
matur on the warrant does nothing to ameliorate the unconstitutional seizure of the
property.
Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
The Court in Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), dismissed a similar
argument:
The fact that the execution is issued in the first instance by an agent of the State,
but not from a Court . . . is a familiar method in Georgia and is open to no ob-
jection.
Id. at 31, quoted with approval in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613
(1974). The state agent in Coffin was the state banking commissioner. See Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 n.13 (1972); IA. CODE CIV. Pao. ANN. art. 282, comment
(b) (West 1961); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at 22-23.
67. See 416 U.S. at 632 (dissenting opinion). See also notes 47, 64 & 66 supra; notes
68-69 infra.
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is clear that the Louisiana judge passing upon an application for a writ
of sequestration is presented with no more evidence than presented be-
fore an authorized court clerk under the replevin procedure in
Fuentes.68  In both cases, the sufficiency and truth of the creditor's
claim of contractual default must be determined from his verified affi-
davit, the credibility of which is buttressed by posting bond as security
for payment of damages the defendant may sustain should the writ be
wrongfully obtained.6 9 Yet the majority does not clarify how a judge
may divine more factual background data from the four corners of an
affidavit than may a court clerk, especially where the critical factual is-
sue is the existence of a default under the terms of an installment sales
contract unilaterally declared by a party whose self-interest is evident.7
68. See note 47 supra. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632-33
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Florida law provides:
Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person
or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover them and any damages sustained
by reason of the wrongful caption or detention as herein provided.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972-73). To conform with Florida procedure, the cred-
itor-seller needed only to fill in the blanks on the appropriate form, then submit it to
the small claims court clerk to sign and stamp before issuing the writ of replevin. 407
U.S. at 75. To comply with the Pennsylvania statute, also invalidated in Fuentes, the
procedure was identical (PA. RuLE Civ. PRo. 1073 (1967)), although a prothonotary
rather than a court clerk issued the writ. Under both statutes, bond in double the value
of the property to be seized had to be posted by the applicant before the writ would
issue.
69. See note 47 supra. Justice Powell, concurring, states that the showing required
by article 3501 is equivalent to a showing of probable cause to believe that the applicant
is entitled to the requested relief-a "factually convincing showing' that the property is
wrongfully in the possession of the debtor. 416 U.S. at 425-26. The Fuentes Court,
in disagreement with this view, stated:
To be sure, the requirements that a party seeking a writ must first post a bond,
allege conclusorily that he is entitled to specific goods, and open himself to possible
liability in damages if he is wrong, serve to deter wholly unfounded applications
for a writ. But those requirements are hardly a substitute for a prior hearing, for
they test no more than the strength of the applicant's own belief in his rights.
[n.13: They may not even test that much. For if an applicant for the writ knows
that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access to
legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a substantial
possibility that a summary seizure of property-however, unwarranted-may go un-
challenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity.] Since his
private gain is at stake, the danger is all too great that his confidence in his cause
will be misplaced. Lawyers and judges are familiar with the phenomenon of a
party mistakenly but firmly convinced that his view of the facts and law will pre-
vail, and therefore quite willing to risk the costs of litigation. Because of the under-
standable, self-interested fallibility of litigants, a court does not decide a dispute
until it has had an opportunity to hear both sides-and does not generally take even
tentative action until it has itself examined the support for the plaintiff's position.
407 U.S. at 83.
70. Mitchell does not satisfactorily address itself to the question of how the validity
of the facts alleged in the vendor-creditor's supporting affidavit for a writ of sequestra-
tion may be evaluated other than in the context of an adversarial hearing where all rele-
vant facts are exposed.
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The Court would answer that to comply with procedural due process,
the statutory procedure need not provide total safeguard against wrong-
ful seizure so long as the risk is minimized; thus, the truth of the affi-
davit need not be ascertained beyond a probabilistic standard, preclud-
ing the absolute necessity for a preseizure hearing. 71 Even so, the
opinion provides little to convince one that such a showing by a self-
interested party, revealing at best a reasonable basis for his claim, can
be accurately characterized as a "factually convincing showing.
'72 It
must remain, dicta in the majority and dissenting opinions to the con-
trary, 73 an open question whether the judiciary may influence, at the
initiation of the sequestration process, the number of wrongful issu-
ances of the writ merely by affidavit review.
71. 416 U.S. at 609. When the risk of error can, as completely as judicially possible,
be eliminated by a hearing prior to issuance of the writ, this risk does not appear to
be one which the state must necessarily assume unless a special state or creditor interest
was thereby furthered. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972). Justice Douglas
in Sniadach had emphasized that summary processes which delayed a hearing could be
constitutionally employed in limited circumstances where a compelling state or creditor
interest was manifest. 395 U.S. at 339. In Fuentes, due process analysis determined
the taking to be a deprivation if the procedures employed did not protect a "special state
or creditor" interest. 407 U.S. at 90-93. The holding in Fuentes ostensibly foreclosed
a creditor's concurrent interest in property sought to be replevied from qualifying as a
"special" interest.
The state interest secured by the unconstitutional Fuentes procedure is arguably
identical to that secured by the valid Mitchell procedure. Yet the Mitchell majority
opinion is singularly devoid of reference to the accomplishment of a state interest under
sequestration. The relative merit of the state's interest in providing creditors with sum-
mary process would appear to have no weight in Mitchell's due process balancing test.
Despite Justice Whites emphasis in Mitchell upon what the vendor must show to obtain
the writ and its judicial issuance, he would agree that perfection is not possible under
the procedure. 416 U.S. at 609-10, 618. Mitchell declares that the state action involved
is satisfactory under fourteenth amendment due process standards so long as authorized
wrongful repossessions are "minimized." Id.
In effect, the state is creating a presumption in favor of the validity of the seller's
declaration of contractual default by permitting issuance of the writ prior to judicial de-
termination of default. Id. at 629-30 n.1. The risk "diminished" by this procedural
safeguard may not be otherwise defined than as action undertaken by the state to deprive
a person of property rightfully possessed, yet outside the fourteenth amendment proscrip-
tion against depriving persons of property without due process. In sanctioning such risk,
Mitchell accords due process to a system which has a built-in capacity to err on the
side of the only person whose interests may be affected under the fourteenth amendment.
The adverse effect upon the seller by being unable to dispossess his debtor without a
prior hearing is not the result of state action and thus not subject to due process attack.
In essence, Mitchell holds it to be within the scope of due process for a state to expose
one party to the risk of a wrongful deprivation of his property in order to mitigate the
other's contractual losses.
72. 416 U.S. at 626 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 608, 609-10, 615, 616 (majority opinion); id. at 633 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
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B. Realities
The Mitchell Court's second line of inquiry into the due process af-
forded by the Louisiana sequestration procedure examines the "reali-
ties" of installment sales transactions with the object of determining
whether the procedure as a whole reaches a constitutional accommo-
dation of the respective interests of buyer and seller in permitting pre-
hearing sequestration of the seller's collateral.
74
The installment credit realities, as viewed by the Court, are that the
seller shoulders the greatest risk in event of buyer's default, because
from the moment of default until he regains possession of the goods,
the seller is uncompensated for the deterioration in resale value of his
security. Such deterioration is normally offset by the buyer's continu-
ing installment payments. 75 Concealment from judicial process and de-
struction or alienation of the goods by the buyer also pose risks to the
seller, doubly so because of the precarious nature of the statutory secu-
rity interest he has retained. 76  Sequestration reduces the possibility
that the buyer will transfer possession of the goods and thus defeat a
Louisiana statutory vendor's privilege.77  If the opportunity were af-
74. Id. at 607-09.
75. Id. at 608. The major justification for sequestration advanced by the Mitchell
Court is that, prior to issuance of the writ, while the chattel remains in the debtor's
possession, the seller will suffer unmitigated loss if the buyer in fact has defaulted on
the installment sales contract. Id. at 608. The writ enables the seller to suspend such
loss by cutting short the duration of a debtor's wrongful possession.
Without summary process, apart from other legal or contractual remedies available to
a creditor faced with a defaulting debtor, the seller appears to be without protection
against this risk. Under the procedure, however, the risks inherent in the installment
sales transaction are shifted to the debtor and become the single risk that the writ of
sequestration will wrongfully issue. The fact that it is against the seller's interest to
initiate the process, in the Mitchell analysis, counterbalances the necessary risk under
the procedure of mistaken issuance of the writ:
The potential damages award available, if there is a successful motion to dissolve
the writ, as well as the creditor's own interest in avoiding interrupting the transac-
tion, also contributes to minimizing this risk [wrongful or mistaken issuance of a
writ of sequestration by a trial judge].
Id. at 610.
76. Id. at 608-09.
77. Id. The vendor's privilege is an unrecorded security interest in goods sold on a
credit basis attaching automatically by operation of Louisiana law, providing the seller
with high preference in the collateral against other creditors. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art.
3227 (West 1952). The privilege generally continues in effect only so long as the col-
lateral is in the possession of the buyer. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3228 (West 1952);
see Comment, Vendor's Privilege, 4 TuL. L. REv. 239 (1930). It should be noted that
in jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor appears to
be in a stronger position to assert his interest against transferees of his buyer. See Uas-
FORM COMMNRCIAL CODE § 9-307.
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forded for notice and hearing prior to the buyer being dispossessed of
the collateral, the risks of concealment, alienation and destruction ap-
parently could not be insured against under the design of a statu-
tory procedure: "The danger of destruction or alienation cannot be
guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied.
The notice itself may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad
faith."
7' 8
Mitchell's due process assurance of an accommodation of buyer and
seller's respective interests ultimately favors the party best able to make
the other whole in event his possession is later determined wrongful.70
The "realities" focused upon by the Court which entitle Louisiana to
arm its creditors with sequestration process pertain to the interim period
prior to seizure, after the buyer has defaulted, during which time the
buyer is not in a position to make the seller whole.80 The seller alone,
by virtue of a statutorily required bond covering payment of expenses,
damages, and attorney's fees in event the writ of sequestration wrong-
fully issues, is in this position.81
With alluring logic, Mitchell reasons that, since no court-ordered sei-
zure procedure could guarantee against a buyer's contractual default,
nor would it be feasible for a statutory procedure aimed at repossession
to be preventative rather than remedial, Louisiana may terminate the
transaction at the creditor-seller's request upon buyer's default. Rela-
tively greater statutory protection for an installment contract seller is
thus held to be a constitutionally justifiable accommodation of buyer's
and seller's interests. 82
78. 416 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added). Note that sequestration apparently guards
against the particular risk of the debtor's destroying, alienating, or concealing collateral
in his possession because he is given no advance notice of the seizure of the collateral.
Sequestration has no deterrent effect when the same acts by the debtor are not motivated
by retaliation. Sequestration, as with other remedies, can only be used well if used
wisely. There are no inherent limitations on the procedure which might guarantee that
the seller's unannounced intervention would be opportune.
79. Id. at 608.
80. In pursuit of the practical realities of the sequestration procedure's effects in ter-
minating the transaction between buyer and seller, the Court arrives at its ratio deci-
dendi in one core proposition: "The debtor, unlike the creditor, does not stand ready
to make the opposing party whole, if his possession, pending a prior hearing, turns out
to be wrongful." Id. at 608.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 608-09; cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 100-03 (1972) (White, J., dis-
senting). Mitchell did not mention the promotion of debtor, creditor, and state interests
which may flow from adherence to the Fuentes principle. Though less practically ex-
pedient, prior notice and an opportunity to defend against seizure pursuant to a writ of
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The Mitchell characterization of the realities of secured installment
sales significantly affects the weight given to the creditor or debtor
balance of interests.83  Installment buyer Mitchell's interest in the se-
questered property was one of full legal title subject to divestment and
possible dispossession in event of default under the terms of the install-
ment sales contract.84  A factor which does not appear in the Mitchell
analysis is the equity in the purchased merchandise represented by in-
stallment payments accumulated over the period of the buyer's posses-
sion. Under the Court's balance of interests analysis, the greater the
buyer's equity in the sequestered property the more accommodating to
his interests fourteenth amendment due process apparently must be-
come, because as the buyer builds equity through installment payments,
the seller's risk of substantial loss in the event of default correspond-
ingly diminishes in proportion.
A comparison of risks inherent in the credit transaction further re-
veals that, while the seller is assuming a risk in extending credit by giv-
ing value in exchange for the buyer's promise to pay at a future date,
the seller normally provides against adverse contingencies by finance
charges or increased prices in the merchandise sold on credit.85  In ex-
sequestration would be an efficacious safeguard against wrongful or mistaken seizures:
"Mhe right to a prior hearing . . . is the only truly effective safeguard against arbi-
trary deprivation of property." 407 U.S. at 83. Were the judiciary to fully step into
the property contest prior to issuing the writ, more benefit than cessation of wrongful
seizures might follow. If sequestration afforded no one-upmanship to the creditor, the
overall effect of utilizing the earliest opportunity for a hearing would be a tightening
of judicial control over credit transactions. This in turn should promote the peaceful
and orderly settlement of commercial disputes. At a pretermination hearing, the ig-
norant purchaser would be immediately advised of the legal recourses open to him. Id.
at 83 n.13. The indigent purchaser would be directed to legal services and counsel
where the jurisdiction of the court permitted them. Id. Leverage gained by the creditor
in initiating suit or threatening to repossess would be attenuated because the hearing
would reveal previous overreaching or procedural abuses.
83. Much, of course, may depend upon how either party to the contract is character-
ized in evaluating the realities of credit transactions. Courts in general have a marked
tendency to award judgment to "ignorant," "uneducated," "poor" consumers and sellers
who "deal at arms length," reflecting perhaps latent empathy or philosophic amity for
the respective positions. The Mitchell Court did not so indulge itself in illustrating the
plight of the prevailing party.
84. The transaction in Mitchell was not cast in the form of a conditional sales agree-
ment (seller retains title) as in Fuentes, where the Court qualified the seemingly lesser
entitlement of a right to possession as a property interest capable of deprivation under
the fourteenth amendment. Fuentes held that the form of the transaction did not affect
the fourteenth amendment character of the property. 407 U.S. at 86-87.
85. Hearings on the Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit Practices Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1968). See generally D. CAPLovrrz, THE PooR PAY Moan
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change for immediate possession, petitioner Mitchell agreed to pay a
major financing charge beyond the basic price of the merchandise. To
the extent that finance charges reflect risks of the seller other than
buyer default, the debtor is insuring the seller against more than the
possibility that he individually will alienate, conceal, or eventually prove
judgment proof.5s The seller, while clearly the party in the position to
suffer the loss occasioned by buyer's default, is thus in a position to
minimize such loss resulting from deterioration in the resale value of his
security during court supervised possession, his own tentative reposses-
sion, or retention by the buyer pending final outcome of a hearing
as required by Fuentes.s7
Sniadach and Fuentes' consideration of the impact upon the debtor
in having his possession summarily terminated remains a viable com-
ponent in the due process accommodation analysis, according to the
Mitchell Court.s Justice White gives short shrift to Mitchell's argument
as to the severity of the deprivation of the appliances at issue: first, be-
cause petitioner did not immediately avail himself of an opportunity for
a "full hearing on the matter of possession,"8 and, second, because his
"basic source of income is unimpaired." 90  This logic is based on a
premise that the debtor will, if truly feeling the severity of being de-
prived, take the most immediate measures to regain possession. Con-
(1963); ComwuRcw. LAw AND PRAcricn Cous HANDBOOK SERIEs No. 85, CON-
sUMER CREDrT 1973 (1973); THE LAW AND TE Low INcOME CONSUMER (H. Katz ed.
1968). Unlike other forms of insurance, the finance charge does not particularize the
risk posed by an individual installment sales contract purchaser by offering reduced
rates to individuals considered unlikely to default. Rather, by standardized financing
charges, the seller is able to absorb and spread over all credit purchasers the defaults and
consequent loss caused by a few.
86. Buyer defaults only partially account for the increased costs and higher finance
charges in lower income urban areas. See note 85 supra.
87. See notes 75, 78 supra.
88. 416 U.S. at 610, 618.
89. Id. at 610. Mitchell asserted his challenge at the first opportunity offered by the
Louisiana sequestration procedure, and his appeal was taken from a motion to dissolve
the writ of sequestration made in the City Court of New Orleans. Id. at 602-03, Is
the Court implying that Mitchell himself presumed that he had no non-constitutional
defenses to assert at the hearing of his motion, therefore that a loss on the contractual
cause of action by Mitchell would moot his constitutional challenge to the procedure?
See note 102 infra. Bootstrapping aside, the immediacy of the buyer's challenge or
whether buyer in fact does challenge may entail factors such as intimidation or ignor-
ance of a statutory right to challenge the taking, as well as a lack of defense on the
merits to the creditor's action. If impact is to be measured by the rapidity with which
the debtor challenges the taking, the Mitchell opinion does not expose the force of its
reasoning. So far as the Court adopts this argument, its premises must be implied.
90. 416 U.S. at 610.
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versely, if he does not challenge the taking, the deprivation is not
sufficiently severe and its impact not appreciable. 91
In demonstrating that Mitchell's deprivation was of de minimis sever-
ity, the Court concludes its consideration of debtor impact in a single
phrase-"his basic source of income is unimpaired.' '1 2  This phrase
reaches directly back to the holding in Sniadach.93 Mitchell would dis-
regard the severity of any deprivation which does not affect the debtor's
basic source of income, apparently limiting the impact argument to
wage garnishments.94 The Fuentes rationale, however, retains its co-
gency: how may a constitutional basis of distinction be drawn between
deducting a percentage of a debtor's paycheck and removing his refrig-
erator or stove?95
The assessment of the impact on the individual debtor and the
weight to be granted it in the Court's due process balancing an lysis
remains undefined and indeterminate after Mitchell. It is an inescap-
able conclusion that Mitchell vitiates the informed conscious concern
for the impact of summarily depriving individuals of necessities of life
evident in Sniadach and Fuentes.96
91. Compare the following statement:
To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of law,
it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have
led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits.
Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
92. 416 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
93. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. What Fuentes had joined, Mitchell
in a single phrase put asunder, returning to limitations Fuentes clearly abrogated, if the
Sniadach opinion itself did not. Fuentes' extensive analysis of debtor impact would ap-
pear to have been overlooked by the Mitchell Court.
95. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
96. From the standpoint of severe deprivation, no more sympathetic a factual situa-
tion for implementing the purpose of preseizure notice and hearing requirements could
be before a court than that in Guzinan v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262
(D.N.D. 1974). After an asserted delinquency in installment payments under a secured
sales contract, seller's assignee attached a mobile home in which the buyer was residing.
Contesting the attachment leading to his eviction, the buyer relied upon Sniadach and
Fuentes to assert that seizure without prior notice and hearing pursuant to North Dakota
attachment statutes violated fourteenth amendment due process. The court cited
Mitchell extensively in rejecting the constitutional challenge:
That such an eviction does create a hardship on the debtors cannot be challenged,
but to be free from resultant hardships is not one of the Tights guaranteed by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Id. at 1267. A constitutional argument based solely upon the severity of the summary
deprivation of property in the eighth circuit would appear to be insufficient to invoke
an application of the Fuentes preseizure hearing standard of review.
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III. THE NORTH GEORGIA FINISHING SHUFFLE
The North Georgia Finishing Court, noting that the defendant's cor-
porate or individual status is nondeterminative on the issue of whether
the debtor will suffer irreparable injury as a result of the seizure, held
that the garnishment procedure lacked sufficient safeguards against risk
of initial error in issuing summary process. 97  Immediately after filing
a complaint seeking judgment against North Georgia Finishing, Inc.,
on a defaulted account, Di-Chem, Inc., filed an affidavit stating that an
action was pending and that it "'had reason to apprehend the loss of
said sum [$51,279.17], or some part thereof, unless process of garnish-
ment issues'. . ".." Summons of garnishment thereupon issued and
was served upon the bank in which the defendant had its bank account.
The majority opinion in North Georgia Finishing did not identify the
specific grounds for its decision.99 By a recitation of Sniadach,
Fuentes, and Mitchell, the Court indicated that the Fuentes or Mitchell
analyses were confined neither to secured sales transactions nor to con-
sumers who might be irreparably damaged by a summary deprivation of
necessities.' 00 North Georgia Finishing reaffirms Fuentes' expansion
of the Sniadach principle to encompass more than wage garnishments
and reiterates Fuentes' insistence that the right to a hearing is not to
be conditioned upon the severity of particular deprivations; 101 however,
the Court makes the word "prior" conspicuous by its omission when
stating the Fuentes holding:
Because the official seizures had been carried out without [ ]
notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against
mistaken repossession, they were held to be in violation of the Four-
,teenth Amendment.
0 2
97. 95 S. Ct. at 722-23.
98. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 194 S.E.2d 508, 509 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972).
99. Justice White authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion joining in the majority opinion,
and Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion joining in the result but not the majority's
reasoning. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
100. 95 S. Ct. at 722-23.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). Fuentes did not look beyond prior notice and
hearing requirements for a safeguard against "mistaken repossession." "Other safe-
guards" are discussed solely in the Mitchell analysis. Fuentes had foreseen that matters
such as the posting of bond and filing of sworn factual allegations, the length or severity
of the deprivation, and the relative simplicity of the issues underlying the creditor's claim
to possession were relevant, but only in determining the formal adequacy of the dispos-
sessory hearing. 407 U.S. at 83-84. The procedures sub judice in Fuentes both permit-
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Holding the Georgia garnishment statut6 "vulnerable for the same
reasons" as the attachment procedures in Fuentes, the North Georgia
Finishing majority goes on to cite the lack of opportunity for an early
hearing and the absence of participation by a judicial officer in issuing
the writ'°3 -two key factors in -the Mitchell analysis. By stopping short
of an absolute proscription against seizures not preceded by notice and
hearing, yet grafting judicial participation onto Fuentes' requirement of
an "appropriate" form of hearing, the majority clearly desires to recon-
cile or consolidate factors of both the Mitchell and Fuentes tests.1°4
Having fashioned this hybrid analysis by which to strike down the gar-
nishment procedures at issue, the Court found lacking the procedural
assurances which were the "saving characteristics" distinguishing the
statutes in Mitchell from those in Fuentes: (1) the writ of garnishment
was issued by a court clerk, (2) plaintiff's affidavit, stating the amount
claimed to be due and the reason for apprehending "loss of said sum or
part thereof' unless garnishment issues, was required to contain only con-
clusory allegations, (3) there was no provision for an early hearing,
nor was the plaintiff required to demonstrate probable cause for the
garnishment, and (4) in order to dissolve -the garnishment the debtor
was required to post bond to secure payment to plaintiff of any judg-
ment rendered. 0 5
The North Georgia Finishing decision may presage a diminishing in
significance of realities discussed under Mitchell's accommodation anal-
ysis. 08 First, the Court makes no inquiry into, nor does it attempt to
balance, the creditor's interest in prejudgment garnishment. Second,
in entertaining respondent garnishor's contention that the holdings
ted posting of bond in order for the debtor to regain possession; in Florida, however,
the debtor had only to "eventually have opportunity" for hearing on the action on the
underlying debt. Id. at 75. In Pennsylvania, a post-seizure complaint was required. Id.
at 78. However, no amount of bond, counterbond or post-seizure hearings could remedy
what Fuentes deemed a wrongful seizure violative of due process once it had occurred:
"no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that
was subject to the right of procedural due process [notice and a hearing prior to the
taking] has already occurred." Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
103. 95 S. Ct. at 722.
104. Id. The Court states:
Here, a bank account, surely a form of property, was impounded and, absent a
bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged
debt, all by a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or oppor-
tunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer.
Id. This analysis blends factors in the Fuentes and Mitchell tests: "early," if taken
to mean either pre- or post-seizure, clearly compromises the Fuentes principle. So long
as the hearing occurs within a reasonable time after seizure, this term should receive
no further definition by state or federal courts.
105. Id. at 722-23.
106. See notes 74-96 supra and accompanying text.
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in Fuentes and Mftchell must be limited because of the indi-
vidual debtor's particular susceptibility to irreparable damage, the Court
responded:
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more
likely suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts,
but the probabiiity of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently
great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk
of initial error.' 07
this brief allusion to a subject which, Iunder Sniadach, Fuentes, or
Mitchell, would be within the proper scope of due process analysis, 08
gives rise to an inference that a factual, ad hoe determination of reali-
'ties may no longer be necessary in each case. The "saving characteris-
tics" serving to minimi e the risk of wrongful dispossession in Mitchell
aeeobjective criteria which have application independently of debtor-
creditor realities. 1 9 Statutory minimization of risk may thus foreclose
a debtor from an examination of individual realities to show a para-
mount interest in the property deserving of constitutional protection.
The debtor seeking to invalidate a summary prejudgment remedy
must establish a lack of substantial parallels between a challenged at-
tachment procedure and the "narrow door"110 of the Louisiana consti-
tutional paradigm."' Thus, the debtor must be capable of demonstrat-
.ug which of the following indices of constitutionality are necessary and
which are merely sufficient due process assurances of a statutory attach-
ment procedure:
1) A judge must participate in the issuance of the attachment writ;"12
107. 95 S. Ct. at 723.
108. See notes 28-40, 74-96 supra and accompanying text.
,,109. Such an approach may be intimated from North Georgia Finishing's recital of
the Mitchell statutory protections. 95 S. Ct. at 722-23.
110. The issue before us . . . is whether the New York provisions . . . squeeze
Sthrough the narrow door of constitutionality left open in Mitchell, or remain out
in the unconstitutional territory charted in Fuentes.
;Sigar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 382 F. Supp. 643. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
111. See, e.g., Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974).
112. Justices Powell (95 S. Ct. at 723), Blackmun (id. at 726), and Stewart (416 U.S.
at 629) have authored opinions which disagree as to the constitutional significance of
a judicial issuance of ex parte writs. Justice Brennan may hold the same view, based
upon his dissent in Mitchell. A requirement of judicial participation would be to insure
preliminary discretion in issuing the writ; discretion could not be exercised unless a
finding can be made on the applicant's showing. If the applicant need only make con-
-clusory allegations .in the form of an affidavit without evidentiary support, the judge
Would possess no greater discretion than a court clerk. Thus the factor of judicial par-
ticipation is subsidiary to whether a sufficient showing is a mandatory prerequisite to
the court ordered seizure. See Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262, 1266
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2) Grounds for the attachment are clearly demonstrated before the
writ may issue,"13
3) The attaching creditor must post bond;' 14
4) A hearing at which the grounds for attachment are proven or at
which all issues relevant to a continued enforcement of 'the at-
tachment are resolved must be provided, if not prior to the seizure,
at the earliest opportunity thereafter;
1 5
(D.N.D. 1974) ("[hlowever, the fact that the issuance of the warrant of attachment
by a clerk or a judge after a showing of probable cause is a ministerial act is not a
constitutional deficiency"); notes 68-69 supra.
113. Evidentiary (i.e., a showing similar to probable cause for the seizure) 'rathei
than conclusory allegations made by affidavit would gain majority support from
the Court, as demonstrated by the holdings in Mitchell and North Georgia Fin-
ishing. For this purpose, the creditor or his representative must at a minimum have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit. North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 722 (1975). The Mitchell court introduced this factor
primarily for the purpose of distinguishing the Pennsylvania replevin procedure in Fuen-
tes, which did not require a hearing upon the debt itself. 407 U.S. at 77. Insistence upon
evidentiary proof of the basis upon which the writ is to be issued is critical if the party
seeking the writ need not initiate a court action on the underlying debt for which the at-
tached property is claimed as security. Under the Mitchell holding, since a hearing in
connection with the prejudgment seizure must be had at some time, the importance of a
nonconclusory affidavit supporting the writ would seem lessened. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist would hold a conclusory affidavit constitutionally
permissible so long as the procedure is incidental to suit and requires plaintiff to post
double bond. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem , Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 729 (1975).
The quantum of proof required depends upon state court construction of the practice nec-
essary under the particular attachment statute. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383.F.
Supp. 643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A typical example of allegations made by fillingin
the blanks on a standardized application form appears in Guzman, where the attachment
statute requires that the affidavit set forth the grounds for attachment in the same lan-
guage provided by the statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-05 (1960)., Justices Stewart,
Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan (perhaps), dissenting in Mitchell, would contend that
such pro forma allegations are per se conclusory, never providing evidentiary support
for a creditor's affidavit unless more information is required.
114. Plaintiff was required to post bond under the procedures at issue in Fuentes,
Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing. The unconstitutionality of the Florida, Pennsyl-
vania, and Georgia procedures would suggest that this is merely a sufficient factor, to
be considered in balancing the protections afforded the debtor under summary process.
See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 83-85 (1972); cf. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719,
729 (1975).
115. An attachment procedure will not be deemed unconstitutional for failure to pro-
vide a hearing prior to seizure. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S.
Ct. 719, 722-23 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611-16 (1974).
With respect to the deprivation of basically "necessary" items such as wages, prior hear-
ing remains the requirement as between debtor and creditor. Sniadach*v. Family Fin.
,Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 353-54 (1969). Fuentes minimized the constitutional significance
of the deprivatory impact argument by its reliance upon a prophylactic prior hearing to
prevent unjustified seizures. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1972); see notes
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5) At the hearing, the creditor must sustain the burden of demon-
strating probable cause for the attachment;110
6) Suit must be initiated on the debt underlying the attachment; 17
7) The debtor must have an unconditional right to challenge the at-
tachment upon motion to the court.11 s
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in the field of debtor-creditor
relations and procedural due process may be criticized on a number
of grounds. Nothing in Mitchell demonstrates that the "realities" of
installment sales transactions are dissimilar from those under considera-
34, 37 supra and accompanying text. The impact argument is reinstated in Mitchell, 416
U.S. at 610, and in North Georgia Finishing, 95 S. Ct. at 723. If Mitchell is taken as an
indicator, the future scope of the "necessary" items exception will be limited. See 416
U.S. at 610, 618. Compare cases outside the debtor-creditor realm, where a prior hear-
ing was required for suspension of privileges or benefita afforded by the state: Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (lack of provision in uninsured motorist accident stat-
ute for a driver's license pre-suspension hearing held violative of fourteenth amendment
due process); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (statute providing
public "posting" of notice that individual not to be sold or given liquor violative of due
process where no notice or hearing granted prior to posting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (pretermination evidentiary hearing necessary to provide state wel-
fare recipients procedural due process).
116. One failing of the Georgia garnishment statute was that there was no provision
"for an early hearing at which the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least
probable cause for the garnishment." 95 S. Ct. at 723; cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961). A New
York statute providing a defendant the right to vacate the court's attachment order
placed on him the burden of proving that the attachment "is unnecessary to the security
of the plaintiff." This factor in conjunction with lack of provision for an immediate
post-seizure hearing rendered the procedure unconstitutional. Sugar v. Curtiss Cir-
culation Co., 382 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). All other indices which led
the Mitchell Court to find sequestration constitutional were present under the New
York attachment procedure, including the debtor's right to regain possession of his
attached property by posting bond. Id. at 648.
117. 416 U.S. at 616; 407 U.S. at 77-78.
118. Dictum in North Georgia Finishing suggests that filing bond as a condition prec-
edent to dissolving the garnishment, if no other means of challenging the procedure are
available, may be constitutionally impermissible. 95 S. Ct. at 723. Payments of court
fees and costs for service of process as preconditions of suit have been held violative
of due process in limited circumstances. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973). Imposing court fees on indigent persons may deny them due process by restrict-
ing access to the courts, thereby inhibiting their opportunity to be heard. Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971). This reasoning applies to indigent consumer
debtors who must post bond in order to dissolve a prejudgment writ. But see Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Kras, the Court stressed the existence of alternatives
to the judicial remedy which were not conditioned on the payment of fees. 409 U.S.
at 445-46. Oregon's $25 appellate filing fee was upheld in Ortwvein, since a preliminary
hearing procedure not conditioned on payment of fees was provided. 410 U.S. at
659-60.
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tion in Fuentes; thus, an exception to the preseizure hearing rule is re-
quired to permit judicially issued ex parte writs. The deprivation in
Mitchell is undeniably a deprivation of the same property interest which
is affected, if not by an identical procedure, by one insufficiently dis-
tinct from the Fuentes attachment procedures.119 A particularly damn-
ing critique of a system of jurisprudence based upon stare decisis is that
precedent may be recast to support the constitutional "gut reactions"
of individual members of the Court, 20 yet the Mitchell holding, drawn
from the Court's examination of prior court decisions, stands in direct
contradiction to the one the Fuentes Court drew from the same ex-
amination.' 2' Several justices themselves fault the Court for not adher-
ing to precedent. 2 2  The opinions in Mitchell and North Georgia Fin-
ishing attest to an internal debate on the issue of whether the result
in Mitchell differed from that in Fuentes solely because of changes in
Court membership.
123
This ostensible lack of consistency may equally be attributable to a
Court caught in the throes of an accelerated evolution of procedural
due process in debtor-creditor relations. The judiciary has been re-
sponsive, as have the legislatures of state and federal governments, to
a heightened demand for consumer rights. Birth pangs of a consumer
119. See 416 U.S. at 631-34; notes 64, 66 & 68-69 supra.
120. As Justice Stewart stated in Mitchell: "The only perceivable change that has
occurred since the Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court." 416 U.S. at 635 (dis-
senting opinion) (footnote omitted).
121. Compare:
The pre-Sniadach cases are said by petitioner to hold that "the opportunity to be
heard must precede any actual deprivation of the private property .... They
merely stand for the proposition that a hearing must be had before one is finally
deprived of his property ....
416 U.S. at 611.
inhere is scant support . . . for the proposition that there must be final judicial
determination of the seller's entitlement before the buyer may be even temporarily
deprived of possession of the purchased goods.
Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
with:
hnhe Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that
hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect.
407 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added). If the Mitchell majority is using the word "finally"
to qualify the scope of the principle announced in Fuentes, it introduces a limitation
which is not to be found in the latter case. Id. at 84, 96-97. Mitchell would similarly
remove Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), from its excep-
tional status as precedent (see note 12 supra) and reinstate it as stare decisis in direct
contradiction to the analysis of that case perpetuated through Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), Sniadach and Fuentes, 416 U.S. at 612.
122. Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall) dissenting in
Mitchell, Justice Blackmun (joined by Justice Rehnquist) dissenting in North Georgia
Finishing.
123. 416 U.S. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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consciousness were evident in Sniadach and provided the impetus for
the decision in Fuentes. This impetus subsided in Mitchell, to be par-
tially revived in North Georgia Finishing. The Court's jurisprudential
methodology may thus present a dialectic ultimately culminating with
North Georgia Finishing.
North Georgia Finishing intimates that Mitchell occupies a key posi-
tion in the evolving definition of due process in debtor-creditor relations
and that neither Mitchell nor Fuentes are to be limited to installment
sales contracts or consumer debtors. With the synthetic test in North
Georgia Finishing, the Supreme Court has established a flexible defini-
tion of due process and a pattern for fourteenth amendment review:
Fuentes, renders summary ex parte deprivations of property constitu-
tionally suspect, Mitchell provides the paradigm of constitutionality by
w hich to measure the procedure.
Scott David Rasmussen
